Field Notes #6
Lessons learned (or re-learned) from the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Two Months In
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February has continued to offer a picture of what 21st century state-on-state conflict may look like. Despite Russia’s being a larger, wealthier, and more powerful country and military, it has not been able to fully dominate Ukraine in the way that many expected at the beginning of the conflict. Russian weakness and poor decisions are partially at fault – internal corruption, the failure to coordinate and weigh a main effort/advance, and the political choice to pursue the conflict as a “special military operation” rather than a war have all played their part. On the other side, Ukraine’s resolve, its domination in the Western information environment, and extensive (and growing) support from NATO and other friendly nations have led to victory on the northern front and saved Kyiv.
This conflict is by no means over, and the result is still unpredictable. We highly recommend The War on the Rocks Podcast and the Institute for the Study of War for more detailed information on the conflict itself. For a historical perspective on the effects of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany on Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Bloodlands is a great resource.
For our part at Fairwater, we are considering a few key reminders and lessons to drive our next several lines of effort.
1. Human Willpower wins wars. This conflict reinforces what Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and other great military thinkers have been saying for millennia. While technology, equipment, and the application of the ‘science’ of warfare are critical for winning conflicts, it is ultimately human brains, emotions, and willpower that win the day. The apparently superior morale of the Ukrainian forces and people have supported the country’s defense effort longer than experts believed was possible. In contrast, intercepted communications from Russian soldiers have demonstrated the fear, uncertainty, frustration, and trauma of many individual soldiers.
Harnessing human morale to win wars will be critical in the coming era of conflict, just as it has always been. Increasing the health and resiliency of the minds of our service members before a conflict will be crucial to prepare them for the reality of war. We’re excited to be working with one of our portfolio companies to develop a solution for a portion of this.
2. Logistics can’t win a war, but they may lose it. Apparent Russian logistical problems were extensively covered in the first phase of the conflict. Ukraine’s large borders with neighboring friendly countries has kept their forces resupplied with critical materiel and even augmented their personnel. The inability of either side to achieve air dominance in theater has made ground lines of communication critically important to sustaining battle. Depending on the theater, sea lines of communication will also be critical. Ever more ubiquitous satellite imagery makes understanding and developing ways to interdict these routes more feasible. Both sides’ depots and staging areas are vulnerable. This is a direct challenge to recent American conflicts, where the central staging of equipment in relatively safe locations in/near theater has been either a precursor to conflict or necessary to its sustainment. Developing tools to increase the distribution, automation, and efficiency of our logistical supply chains will be necessary in an age when legacy methods are more vulnerable. This is a component of some of our upcoming efforts.
3. Empowering tactical units in an intermittently connected age. Interception and jamming of communications are important for both the offense and defense in a conflict. Russian attacks on Ukraine have often been coordinated with disruption of communications; intercepting Russian communications has underpinned Ukraine/NATO’s information warfare against the invasion. Mission type orders and delegation of tasks are nothing new, but will prove even more salient in state conflicts than they were in the global war on terror age. Militaries will require efficient tools to facilitate information sharing up and down the chain of command in periods of intermittent jamming. They’ll also increasingly need to concentrate critical intelligence at lower tactical levels instead of in data centers or higher headquarters. Edge processing of tactical information is the next frontier for this.
4. Don’t trust DJI. Probably enough said. The US and its allies need to build their own tools in critical technology areas that don’t rely on ‘neutral’ or adversarial parties to a conflict.
We’re proud of our team and portfolio companies for moving the ball forward in these areas and many more. In thinking of the war in Ukraine, we also don’t forget the very real human suffering, particularly of civilians. They are in our thoughts and prayers.